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Abstract Although the reporting process under UN human rights treaties is considered
one of the most important universal mechanisms to monitor the implementation of
human rights, its actual domestic effects have hardly been studied. This is surprising in
the light of the rather extensive work involved and resources spent on the reporting
process by states and UN human rights treaty bodies. This article attempts to fill the
scholarly neglect by examining the effectiveness of this process in three countries, the
Netherlands, New Zealand and Finland. It also explores some more general conceptual,
theoretical and methodological issues with respect to the definition and measurement of
effectiveness of international (human rights) standards at the domestic level. The empir-
ical results, which are based on extensive document analysis as well as 175 interviews,
are used to test two hypotheses based on domestic and transnational mobilization as well
as reputational and legitimacy-based explanations. The article especially finds support for
the liberalist mobilization thesis, while only limited support is found for reputational and
legitimacy-based explanations, at least in established liberal democracies.
Keywords Effectiveness . International monitoring . Human rights . Domestic
mobilization . Legitimacy. Reputation
JEL Classification F53 . K410
1 Introduction
One of most well-known puzzles in human rights research has been the question as to
whether ratification of human rights treaties has any effect on state behavior. While
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some studies found that treaties have hardly any positive effect and sometimes even a
negative effect (Hathaway 2002; Neumayer 2005; Hill 2010), others actually found
some improvements (Simmons 2009; Lupu 2013; Hafner-Burton 2013). In addition to
this burgeoning literature on Bfirst order compliance^ with treaties, more attention has
recently been paid to so-called Bsecond-order compliance,^ the observance of the
decisions and judgments of courts and committees monitoring international treaties
(Fisher 1981). Especially the judgments of the regional human rights courts, such as the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACHR) have been studied (Von Staden 2009; Anagnostou 2010; Hawkins and
Jacoby 2010; Hillebrecht 2014a). This relatively extensive literature dealing with
regional court’s judgments stands in sharp contrast with the near neglect of research
on international human rights monitoring mechanisms and their domestic impact. One
of the most important international mechanisms to monitor the implementation of UN
human rights treaty standards is the process of state reporting (Alston 1989; Connors
2000: 4; Kälin 2012: 16). This process is based on the obligation of state parties to
submit periodically, usually every 4 or 5 years, a report on the implementation of each
UN human rights treaty and Optional Protocol it has ratified. A treaty body, a
committee consisting of independent experts, examines this report through a so-
called constructive dialogue with representatives of the state party. The assessment of
the state report ends with the adoption of legal non-binding recommendations, the
Concluding Observations (COs).
This article addresses the following research question: what is the effectiveness of
this international human rights monitoring mechanism of state reporting? This will be
examined by looking at the effectiveness of the COs and the extent to which policy,
legislative or any other measures been taken as a result of these COs in the Netherlands,
New Zealand and Finland. As will be explained below, the three countries were
selected because they were considered most-likely cases for the effectiveness of COs.
This article will focus on the COs of the six treaty bodies under the six main and oldest
UN human rights treaties presented in Table 1.
The research question as to the effects of the reporting process and especially its
capacity to induce states to change their behavior is especially pressing in light of the
large financial and bureaucratic implications of this process for both the treaty bodies as
well as states. An illustration of the resource-intensity of the process is that in 2010
alone, 139 state reports were submitted by 92 states with a total of 11,294 pages (Keller
and Ulfstein 2012: 418). In 2012, the 172 treaty body experts of 10 different treaty
bodies were in session for 74 weeks to discuss, amongst others, the different state
reports (Pillay 2012: 17). States who have ratified all treaties and comply with their
reporting requirements usually receive between 100 and 350 recommendations from
the different treaty bodies they report to in a time period of 4 to 5 years (Kälin 2012:
18). In addition, civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also invest
considerable resources in the process since they are allowed to submit alternative
information to the treaty body via so-called shadow or parallel reports.
This article makes two contributions to the existing literature on the effectiveness of
international monitoring mechanisms in the field of human rights. Firstly, this article
offers an empirical contribution as to the effectiveness of the international human rights
monitoring mechanism of state reporting based on the analysis of an original and
extensive range of documents, including parliamentary minutes and government
490 J. Krommendijk
papers, court judgments, newspaper articles and NGO websites, as well as 175
interviews with different domestic actors. Secondly, this article aims to contribute to
theory building and application in the context of International Relations (IR) and
International Law (IL) as well. It tests two hypotheses based on domestic and transna-
tional mobilization as well as legitimacy and reputational-based explanations. In doing
so, this article helps to confirm or infirm the applicability of several underlying theories
about the mechanisms through which international institutions affect the behavior of
Western established liberal democracies.
The structure of the article is as follows. The second section will— after providing a
definition of effectiveness — present the two hypotheses based on IR and IL theories
about the effectiveness of international (human rights) norms. The justification as to
why the Netherlands, New Zealand and Finland were selected is provided in the third
section. The next section presents the methodology used to establish the effectiveness
of COs. After presenting the empirical results in the fifth section, the final section will
reflect on the applicability of the two hypotheses.
2 Theory and literature review
This section presents a literature review of the IR and IL theories that deal with the
domestic impact of and compliance with international (human rights) standards. Before
doing so, some words will be devoted to the concept of effectiveness which is used
throughout this article.
2.1 Defining effectiveness
A lot of research has focused on Bcompliance^ with international norms, which is
defined as Ba state of conformity or identity between an actor’s behavior and a specified
Table 1 Overview of the six main UN human rights treaties and treaty bodies
UN human rights treaty Treaty monitoring body
Convention on the Elimination of All forms
of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) [adopted
in 1965]
Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination (CERD)
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) [1966]
Human Rights Committee (HRC)
International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) [1966]
Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (CESCR)
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
[1979]
Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW Committee)
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT) [1984]
Committee against Torture
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) [1989] Committee on the Rights of the Child
(CRC Committee)
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rule^ (Raustiala 2000: 388). There are several limitations to studying compliance. On
the one hand, (full) compliance may not occur, even though a state has taken subse-
quent measures to address the issue. On the other hand, there may be a situation of
compliance independently from the international norms. This means that behavior is
simply in line with or merely correspond to international norms without these norms
having had any role whatsoever in policy decisions. Compliance, thus, does not tell us
anything about the role or relative weight of the specific norm, also because of other
international norms or (inter)national factors that could have contributed to compliance.
What distinguishes effectiveness from compliance is that effectiveness focuses on the
relation between legal rules or recommendations and the government’s behavior
(Martin 2013). Effectiveness is different from compliance in the sense that it refers to
Bthe extent to which it [the treaty] requires states to depart from what they would have
done in its absence^ (Downs et al. 1996: 383). Effectiveness, thus, implies that
there are Bchanges in behavior that otherwise would not have occurred^
(Raustiala 2000: 394).
Consequently, the starting point of research on the effectiveness of COs is the
recognition that COs have Bvalue if and only if they cause people to do things they
would not otherwise do^ (Mitchell 1994: 425). Effectiveness in the context of this
article is understood as observable changes in behavior that were (partly) the result of
the COs. This refers to changes that can be attributed to the COs, because of a
relationship between the COs and the change. The behavioral change as a result of
COs can take many forms. One could think of (an adjustment of) policy or legislative
measures, the establishment of an interdepartmental working group or committee to
review the policy or legal framework, the commissioning of a report or evaluation, the
establishment of a new institution or the allocation of extra budgetary resources.
COs can also be effective by thwarting an intended or desired behavioral
change. This refers to a situation in which the government is precluded from
taking measures that it would otherwise have taken, because they would go
against the aim of COs. In such an instance, COs limit the policy options and
courses of action available.
2.2 Underlying causal mechanisms
The theoretical starting point of this article follows the observation that the rationalist
external incentive models based on coercion are hardly able to explain the effectiveness of
the COs of the UN human rights treaty bodies. Coercion-based models treat the effec-
tiveness of international (human rights) norms as the result of international material
inducements which manipulate the utility calculations of states, such as sanctions or
positive rewards in the form of aid (Guzman 2008; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
2004). Models based on coercion are, however, rather unsatisfactory to explain the
effectiveness of international human rights treaties and especially the COs. This is because
the extent to which states are willing to coerce other states to comply in the field of human
rights is limited. States usually do not have a strong interest in or incentive to enforce
compliance with human rights in other states (Hathaway 2002: 1938; Simmons 2009: 122
and 126; Dai 2013: 95–96). This article will therefore include two other mechanisms that
could explain the effectiveness of COs; reputational and legitimacy-based explanations
(section 2.2.1) and domestic and transnational mobilization (section 2.2.2).
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2.2.1 Reputational and legitimacy-based explanations
The rational choice model of reputation looks at a state’s concern for damage to its
reputation as a result of Bnaming, shaming and faming^ (Schimmelfennig 2005: 831–
832; Keohane 1997: 497; Hawkins and Jacoby 2010: 41). The central tenet of this
model is that states are committed to maintaining their reputation for abiding by their
international law obligations, because this ensures that other states will cooperate and
enter into agreements with them in future. The rationalist cost-benefit version of
reputation can be compared or contrasted with a more constructivist understanding of
reputation which looks at states’ felt sense of obligation to establish and maintain a
good global standing and be a honorable member of the international community
(Downs and Jones 2002: 96, Sharman 2007: 28; Brewster 2009: 238–241). Downs
and Jones held that reputation is especially relevant for new and developing countries
who are eager in gaining a reputation as a Brule of law^ country and are, hence, more
sensitive towards international criticism (Downs and Jones 2002: 112). On the basis of
Downs and Jones’ finding one could expect that established democracies with a rather
solid human rights reputation can relatively easily ignore or resist implementing
unfavorable or legitimate seeming COs. The reputational costs of the COs of the treaty
bodies can thus vary depending upon the target state.
One crucial precondition for the effectiveness of both reputational models is that the
target state and the wider domestic and international audience bestow reputation on the
treaty bodies and consider them as important and legitimate (Downs and Jones 2002:
98; Risse and Ropp 2013: 14). The possible reputational costs for states for not acting
upon COs are low if a treaty body is not considered legitimate and does not have a solid
reputation. This shows that there is a close relationship between the reputational models
and theories dealing with the legitimacy of international institutions. The latter theories
focus on the international institutions’ legitimacy to explain the extent to which states
take them seriously and change their behavior accordingly. Franck defined legitimacy
as Ba property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull towards
compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the
rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally
accepted principles of right process^ (Franck 1990: 24 and 26). Legitimacy is espe-
cially crucial when courts or other institutions lack coercive means (Alvarez 1991:
206). 1 The concepts of reputation and legitimacy both deal with the impartiality,
authority and expertise of the institution in the eyes of decision makers (Sharman
2007, 32–33). Both concepts thus strongly relate to subjective perceptions and the
belief systems of actors (Trimble 1990: 838–840; Franck 1990: 24 and 26; Alvarez
1991: 206; Hurd 1999: 381, Brewster 2013: 531). They are also social constructs,
which are the result of Ban obscure mix of beliefs, narratives, associations, passions,
etc.^ (Schrag 2010: 27–28; Brunnée and Toope 2013: 131). These constructs are
continuously re-constructed and re-contested through interactions, especially between
1 Legitimacy-based explanations are consistent with the constructivist literature on persuasion, which explains
situations in which actors change their attitudes, beliefs and preferences in the absence of clear material
benefits and coercion (Gibson and Caldeira 1995; Raustiala and Slaughter 2002: 541; Brunnée and Toope
2013: 131). That is to say, one precondition for persuasion to occur is when the persuader is seen as legitimate
or authoritative (Trimble 1990: 835 and 845; Checkel 2001: 562–563; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004:
676).
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government officials and treaty bodies, but also their interaction with the wider world,
including the media, civil society and the academic community.
The relationship between an institution’s legitimacy or reputation and its effective-
ness is primarily formulated as one of correlation in the literature and in hypothesis 1
(see below). This illustrates that the specific causal mechanisms have so far hardly been
spelled out in a detailed fashion in the literature (Brunnée and Toope 2013: 130–132).
This is also because such mechanisms primarily involve complex individual-level
psychological processes, focused on the mindset of decision-makers. The difficulty
of formulating specific causal trajectories is exacerbated by the fact that there are hardly
any instances of Bpure persuasion^ in which the legitimacy or reputation of the
institution is the sole explanation (Risse and Ropp 2013: 14). Legitimacy and reputa-
tion thus depend very much upon the working of other causal mechanisms in order to
have full explanatory power. There is especially a relation with domestic mobilization,
as will be further discussed in section 2.2.2. Mobilization and lobby by domestic actors
is arguably more likely on the basis of legitimate treaty bodies.
Hypothesis 1: The higher the legitimacy and reputation of the treaty body in the eyes
of government officials, the greater the effectiveness of COs of that
respective treaty body.
2.2.2 Domestic and transnational mobilization
The second mechanism incorporated in this article deals with domestic and transna-
tional human rights mobilization and advocacy. This mechanism is grounded on liberal
theories on domestic politics and mobilization. The central tenet of these theories is that
international institutions are able to change the behavior of a state through domestic
institutions, such as domestic courts, and by mobilising domestic advocacy groups,
NGOs, political parties that pressure governments to change behavior (Neumayer 2005:
930; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005: 1385; Simmons 2009). International pressure
can be a necessary, but is not a sufficient condition for policy change in itself. Crucial
for this change is domestic resonance and support (Gourevitch 1978: 911; Putnam
1988: 429–430). Helfer and Slaughter focused on the ability of a supranational tribunal
Bto secure such compliance by convincing domestic government institutions, directly
and through pressure from private litigants, to use their power on its behalf^ (Helfer and
Slaughter 1997: 278). Moravcsik also held that international human rights institutions
Bcoopt^ domestic actors who consequently pressure their governments Bfrom within.^
International norms and institutions can subsequently shift the balance of power within
and between domestic actors and prompt a change in coalitions and calculations
underlying governmental policies, which might eventually lead to a policy change
(Moravcsik 1995). Likewise, Alter held that international courts can act as Btipping
point actors^ by forwarding resources to and supporting compliance constituencies. In
this way, they can tip the political balance in favor of policies in line with international
norms (Alter 2011). Norms and pronouncements of international courts can, thus, be
used as political opportunity structures to strengthen domestic actors’ power vis-à-vis
opponents by granting them additional resources (Börzel and Risse 2000;
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004: 672, Hafner-Burton 2013: 64). Dai’s theory
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on domestic compliance constituencies as Bdecentralised enforcers^ noted how inter-
national norms and institutions can create a focal point for domestic actors and
strengthen their leverage and legitimize their demands (Dai 2005 and 2013). This also
reflects Simmons’ domestic politics theory on compliance with human rights
treaties as Ba tool to support political mobilization^ (Simmons 2009: 135, see
also Hillebrecht 2014b).
The mobilization mechanism also builds on— predominantly constructivist— litera-
ture on transnational human rights advocacy. The most prominent elaboration can be
found in Risse, Ropp and Sikkink’s five phase spiral model of human rights change.2
The main process through which this change takes place is Bnorms socialization,^
which is defined as Bthe process by which principled ideas held by individuals become
norms in the sense of collective understandings about appropriate behavior which then
lead to changes in identities, interests, and behavior^ (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 10).
One of the central tenets of the spiral model is that the diffusion and domestic change in
relation to human rights is dependent on the strength of transnational human rights
pressures and policies and, above all, advocacy networks. These networks consist of
international human rights NGOs, like Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch, domestic NGOs, political parties, the media, intellectuals and international
institutions (Keck and Sikkink 1999). The model incorporates Keck and Sikkink’s
Bboomerang effect,^ which describes how domestic compliance constituencies and
especially NGOs bypass their state to seek international support and link up with
transnational network to bring outside pressure on their states. These international
linkages allow them to gain leverage by introducing new issues, norms and discourses
into the debate and strengthening and amplifying their demands so that the terms of the
debate can shift (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 18; Keck and Sikkink 1999: 90 and 93).
Risse and Sikkink’s spiral model also illustrate that rationalist and constructivist
causal mechanisms often operate in tandem (Börzel and Risse 2000: 2;
Raustiala 2000: 399; Checkel 2001: 581). This joint operation of the two logics
is in line with Checkel’s Bsocial sanctioning^ (Checkel 2001: 558). According
to Checkel, domestic actors can use international norms as Ban additional tool^
or an Badditional weapon for shaming^ to increase the pressure on
policymakers engaging in a cost/benefit analysis (Checkel 2001: 569).
As said in the previous section, there is a close interaction between domestic and
transnational mobilization and reputational and legitimacy-based explanations.
Domestic and transnational actors are more likely to lobby and mobilize on the
basis of COs of treaty bodies that are (generally) considered legitimate and
enjoy reputation (Conant 2006: 79; Cichowski 2006: 11–12). When the respec-
tive treaty body enjoys a solid reputation, this offers (additional) legitimacy and
strength to the demands and arguments of domestic actors (Alter 2011: 7). COs
of such a reputable treaty body offer domestic actors the greatest possibilities of
putting real pressure on the government and thus gives them higher chances of
achieving the desired result. The greater the reputation or legitimacy of the
2 Another example of a socialization model focusing on ‘transnational norm entrepreneurs’ is Koh’s ‘trans-
national legal processes’ (Koh 1997: 2640 and 2645). For a related theory, see the social process of
acculturation based on ‘cognitive and social pressures to conform with the behavioral expectations of the
wider culture’ (Goodman and Jinks 2008: 726).
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treaty body, the larger the reputational costs for the state will be when it does
not act upon the COs will be.
Hypothesis 2: The greater the level of domestic or transnational mobilization with
respect to the COs of a treaty body, the higher the effectiveness of COs
of that treaty body.
3 Country selection
The Netherlands, New Zealand and Finland were selected, because they were consid-
ered most likely cases for the effectiveness of international monitoring in the field of
human rights. There are several reasons for focusing on countries in which the process
and the COs potentially Bwork^ instead of countries in which one would expect hardly
any result from the outset. This is, firstly, because much has already been written about
the limited effectiveness of the process of state reporting and deficiencies in the
functioning of the treaty bodies (Alston and Crawford 2000; Bayefsky 2000;
Keller and Ulfstein 2012). This means that the instances and factors contribut-
ing to the ineffectiveness of most of the COs are rather well known. Secondly,
a most-likely case selection also enables the analysis of the mechanisms and
conditions under which specific COs have been effective. Such an analysis also
helps to test the two hypotheses presented in the previous section. Focusing on
least likely cases would not be particular fruitful for this endeavor (Landman
2009: 38–39).
The Netherlands, New Zealand and Finland — as established strong liberal
democracies— are considered most likely cases. Western liberal democracies take the
reporting requirement relatively seriously and report with the least delays
(Leblanc et al. 2010). This is because these countries usually have an adequate
bureaucratic and financial capacity to fulfil the rather burdensome reporting require-
ments and implement the numerous COs. Several rationalist liberal IR approaches
discussed in section 2.2.2 have also shown that international human rights processes
have beenmost effective in countries committed to the rule of law and democracy with a
domestic human rights culture and domestic constituencies in the form of active civil
society actors and NGOs, an independent judiciary and a free press as Ban
enabling domestic environment^ (Helfer and Slaughter 1997: 329–330; Heyns
and Viljoen 2001; Hafner-Burton 2013). This assumption also reflects a logic of
appropriateness argument that international human rights norms are particularly
effective in stable democracies, because human rights protection is considered
to be the norm and the right thing to do.
Three relatively similar countries within the group of Western liberal democracies
were chosen in order to avoid too much variance and thus limit the number of differing
and potentially confounding variables within the group of Western liberal democracies
as far as possible. Comparing most similar countries with considerable commonalities
better enables isolating the factors that might explain (the variation in) the effectiveness
of COs (Landman 2009: 33–34). The three countries are similar in the sense of
not being a federal state and not having a strong constitutional court. Research
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has shown that human rights implementation in a federal state adds an addi-
tional layer of complexity (Heyns and Viljoen 2001: 508). In addition, countries
with powerful Constitutional or Supreme Courts have experienced a hampered
reception of international human rights law. Several scholars found that courts
in such countries tend to be reluctant to base their rulings on the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as an independent source of law,
because they primarily defend national human rights. As a result, such a strong
national Bpre-existing human rights judicial tradition^ in countries like Germa-
ny, Italy and Ireland, was found to hamper the reception of ECHR and the
jurisprudence of ECtHR (Keller and Stone Sweet 2008: 686; Helfer and
Slaughter 1997: 332–333).
The decision was made to select the Netherlands and Finland, who both consistently
rank high in democracy indexes and have a relatively open constitutional and political
system for the reception of international law (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2013: 3).
Finland is one of the Nordic countries, which are regarded as consistent compliers with
international norms (Falkner et al. 2005; Sverdrup 2004). Finland was chosen
from the Nordic countries, primarily because of the availability of academic
literature in English about UN human rights treaties in Finland (Heyns and Viljoen
2001; Niemi 2003). Both the Netherlands and Finland are members of ECHR regime
and the EU. The choice was made to include one country which is not a member of
such regional (human rights) systems. This was inspired by earlier findings that UN
human rights treaties and the COs are often overlooked because of the pervasiveness of
ECHR and EU law and the stronger enforcement mechanisms in the form of the
ECtHR and the Court of Justice of the European Union (Krommendijk 2012a: 473–
474; Langford 2010; Heyns and Viljoen 2001: 520–521; Steiner 2000: 34). New
Zealand was selected out of the group of non-European Western democracies that also
include Australia, Canada and the United States. New Zealand is not a member of a
regional (human rights) system like Canada or the United States. Neither is New
Zealand a federal state like Australia, Canada or the United States, nor does it have a
constitutional court like the United States. This article will, however, only marginally
reflect on the differences between the three countries and the expectation of a higher
effectiveness of the COs in a country which is not a member of a (strong) regional
human rights regime (Krommendijk 2014a, b).
4 Research design: Methodology to assess the effectiveness of COs
This section will discuss the methodology used for the assessment of the
effectiveness of the COs. The methodology is based on three approaches,
whereby the last two are designed to answer the two hypotheses formulated
in the previous section.
Firstly, this article tried to approximate the effectiveness of COs in the three
countries. Table 2 lists the indicators that were used to assess the (in)effectiveness of
COs. The assessment was largely based on an analysis of the documents in which the
government gave a reaction to the COs, especially the periodic state reports sent to the
treaty bodies and governmental papers and policy notes sent to parliament. This
document analysis was complemented with semi-structured interviews of domestic
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stakeholders (in)directly involved in the reporting process, including government
officials, NGO representatives, representatives from national human rights and Om-
budsmen institutions, academic scholar, ministers, MPs, lawyers and judges. 3 63
stakeholders were interviewed in the Netherlands, 62 in New Zealand and 50 in Finland
in the period of 2010–2013.
Secondly, hypothesis 1 necessitates assessing whether the treaty bodies are consid-
ered legitimate. This was done on the basis of the interviews with government officials
and members of government who were involved in the reporting process. These
interviews served to establish the officials’ attitudes and perceptions towards the quality
of the different treaty bodies, the process of state reporting and the COs. In addition,
several constructive dialogues with treaty bodies were attended to examine the quality
of the dialogue and to observe the attitude of the officials in the government delegation
in their interaction with the treaty body.
Thirdly, in order to test hypothesis 2 on domestic and transnational mobilization, this
article examined whether domestic actors have been involved in the process and have
3 In order to arrive at a comprehensive and reliable picture, domestic stakeholders in relation to all the six
human rights treaties were interviewed. It was made sure that all the reporting cycles under the six treaties
since the mid-1990s were covered and that officials from all the ministries involved in the reporting process
were interviewed. Interviewees were asked how they regard the effectiveness of COs in their country and the
COs’ role in policy and legislative making. In addition, they were asked to give concrete examples of
measures taken and changes made as a result of COs and specify the role of the COs in this regard. Secondly,
the author questioned the interviewees about policy and legislative changes and measures that in his view
could have been potentially (partly) influenced by COs.
Table 2 Indicators used to measure the effectiveness of COs
Operationalising (in)effectiveness Indicators
Ineffective COs. A distinction will be made between:
- COs that have been (explicitly) rejected
- Standing policy and legislative measures that are
already in line with and simply coincide with the
COs
Indicators that make the absence of a relation between
CO and follow-up measures or actions less likely:
- Government challenges CO on factual and/ or legal
grounds
- No interviewees hold that the CO played a
(considerable) role in the follow-up measures
- No explicit link is made between CO and measures
in Bills, policy documents or reports
- Follow-up measures were announced prior to COs
- Domestic actors have not used the COs in their
lobby leading to the measures
(Partly) effective COs. A distinction will be made
between the following modalities of effectiveness:
- New policy initiatives or extra resources for
(existing) policy measures
- The adoption of legislative changes
- The raising of the salience of an issue (agenda setting
function)
- The initiation of studies or evaluations
- The establishment of a new institution or the
strengthening of an existing one
- The prevention of an intended policy or legislative
course
Indicators that make a relation between CO and
follow-up measures or actions more likely:
- An explicit link is made between CO and measures
in Bills, policy documents or reports
- Measures are taken (shortly) after the CO
- Domestic actors have used the COs in their lobby
leading to the measures
- The number of interviewees who mention the
measures as an example of effectiveness
498 J. Krommendijk
used the COs in their domestic work. This means that this article studied the role of
COs in the political decision making at the executive level, in the legislative process, in
litigation and in NGO lobbying. It was, for example, examined whether MPs submit
(written) parliamentary questions, motions or legislative proposals as a result or on the
basis of the COs. Another matter is whether and how NGOs use the COs in their
domestic advocacy and litigation. For the Netherlands, this was done through a
(database) search of parliamentary minutes and papers, court judgments, newspaper
articles and NGO websites for the period 1 September 1995 until 31 August 2011.4 A
similar search was conducted for parliamentary minutes in New Zealand.5 In addition,
UN documents and academic literature were used as well. This documentary analysis
was supplemented with the views from interviewed domestic actors themselves about
the organization of the process of reporting and the effectiveness of COs. The research
for Finland was primarily based on a documentary analysis of UN documents and
secondary literature as well as interviews.
5 Empirical results
Since the mid-1990s, there have been 74 legislative, policy and other measures in the
Netherlands, New Zealand and Finland which were taken (partly) as a result of the COs
(Krommendijk 2014a: 372). Before elaborating on these effective COs, it should be
noted that a large majority of the COs remained ineffective. Out of a total of more than
1000 COs, more than 900 COs have not had any effect on policy, legislative or other
measures in the three countries. At a first glance, this finding seems disappointing and
low. One should, however, keep in mind that (neo)realist IR theoreticians would not
expect any result from the COs. Likewise, as sketched in the second section, those
following the rationalist external incentive model would neither expect much from the
COs, especially because COs are legally non-binding and the treaty bodies are rather
weak institutions. Legal positivists who are mainly concerned with Bhard^ law based
on legally binding obligations also overlook the impact of COs for the same reasons.
What’s more, the finding of a certain degree of effectiveness of COs is also remarkable
in the light of the anecdotal evidence presented by many scholars and observers that
COs are almost never followed-up (Schmidt 2001: 215; O’Flaherty and O’Brien 2007:
143; Gaer 2011: 114). Schmidt et al. spoke about Bchronic^ or Bdistressing^ levels of
non-compliance and an Bimplementation crisis… of dangerous proportions^ (Schmidt
et al. 1997: 470). Others portrayed the system as Ban empty diplomatic ritual^
or as a system Bin crisis^ (Connors 2000: 4; Bayefsky 2000: 315).
One can broadly distinguish between two categories of ineffective COs. Firstly, the
largest number of ineffective COs are the rather broadly and vaguely formulated ones.
One example is the recommendation of the CERD to the Netherlands to Btake adequate
policy measures to ensure proper representation of ethnic minority groups in the labor
market^ (CERD 2004: 10). Likewise, the CESCR recommended Finland to Bcontinue
4 Use was made of, respectively, Parlando/ Overheid.nl, rechtspraak.nl, Lexis Nexis and Google Search. The
search terms and results can be retrieved from the author upon request.
5 On 14 June 2012, an advanced search was conducted on Hansard, which contains the transcript of debates in
the New Zealand House of Representatives as well as written and oral questions since 1 January 2000.
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strengthening its legal and institutional mechanisms aimed at combating
discrimination^ without giving any concrete policy suggestions (CESCR 2008: 22).
In response to such COs, the governments have usually made clear that measures had
(already) been taken that are in line with or address the COs sufficiently. Thus, COs
frequently coincide with existing policy or legislative measures without having (had)
any effect on them. Secondly, several COs have been rejected by the three govern-
ments. On these occasions, governments have justified their decision not to act upon
COs by pointing to, amongst others, budgetary constraints, diverging views as to the
desirability of policy action or other conflicting interests or human rights obligations.
Hence, domestic political preferences have prevailed. The New Zealand government
dismissed several COs because Bthe intervention proposed by the [CEDAW] Commit-
tee is not preferred by New Zealand^ (MWA 2008: 14–16). Examples are the continued
use of electroshock weapons (tasers) by the police and the unwillingness to halt the
privatization of (some) prisons. The Dutch government was, for example, unwilling to
change its euthanasia policy or revise the lifting on the ban of brothels as a result of the
COs. COs that were related to those points have simply been taken note of. Dutch
government officials spoke about Bagree to disagree^ points and an irreconcilable
(fundamental) difference of opinion.
Most of the legislative, policy or other measures that were taken (partly) as a result
of the COs were related to the COs of the CRC Committee, at least in absolute terms.6
33 of the 74 responses related to the COs from the CRC Committee (Krommendijk
2014a: 374). This different position of the COs of the CRC Committee is illustrated by
Table 3. Table 3 also shows that there are differences between the three countries, with
a slightly higher effectiveness of the COs in Finland.7 Noteworthy is that the COs have
not been more effective in New Zealand than in the other two countries. This is
surprising in the light of the expectation that the COs would be more effective in a
country which is not a member of a (strong) regional human rights system but is only
part of the UN human rights machinery (see section 3). This finding can, however, be
explained by the absence of an external human rights check for New Zealand in line
with the ECHR and ECtHR, which has contributed to a lower salience and more limited
role of human rights in general (Krommendijk 2012b: 610–614).
The next section will closely examine which hypothesis or hypotheses might
account for the effectiveness of the COs. It will also focus specifically on the
6 The differences among the six treaty bodies and six countries are less significant in relative terms, i.e., the
number of effective COs as a percentage of the total number of COs of a treaty body. The following statistical
data should, however, be taken with a grain of salt. This is because it was difficult to arrive at a precise number
for the total of COs for each treaty body and country, since one paragraph in the COs often contains multiple
recommendations. In addition, these figures do not tell anything about the depth of effectiveness (whether COs
merely had an agenda setting function or whether they had a more profound effect in the form of a legislative
change) and the relative importance of the COs amongst other factors in contributing to a certain change. The
effectiveness of the COs of the six treaty bodies is as follows: 8,2 % of the COs of the Committee Against
Torture have been effective (9 out of 109); 8,1 % of CRC Committee (33 out of 401 COs); 6,5 % of CERD (10
out of 154), 6,1 % of the CEDAW Committee (12 out of 224); 3,6 % of the HRC (4 out of 109) and 0 % of
CESCR (0 out of 185). For Finland 7,4 % of the COs adopted by the six treaty bodies have been effective (30
out of 401 of the COs), 5,9 % for New Zealand (20 out of 341) and 5,4 % for the Netherlands (24 out of 446).
7 At the same time, a smaller number of COs has been rejected and Finnish officials have been more positive
about the value of reporting. The difference can be explained by the presence of more favorable domestic
factors in Finland, such as the central organization of the reporting process and the strong compliance culture
(Krommendijk 2014a: 317–363; 2014b).
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differences between the effectiveness of the COs of the six treaty bodies and especially
the higher effectiveness of the COs of the CRC Committee.
6 Examining the hypotheses
6.1 Hypothesis 1: Reputational and legitimacy-based explanations
The reputational and legitimacy-based explanations can hardly account for the effec-
tiveness of COs. Government members and officials were generally negative about the
legitimacy of the six treaty bodies. The views demonstrating a lack of legitimacy and
reputation of the treaty bodies in the eyes of government officials and members of
government were corroborated by public statements in debates or documents as well as
the views expressed in internal memos. These views also echo the observations of
interviewed representatives from human rights institutes and NGOs and the scholarly
literature (Alston and Crawford 2000; Bayefsky 2000; Keller and Ulfstein 2012). Note
that Finnish government officials were not as negative and dismissive as Dutch and
New Zealand officials. They referred to the shortcomings, but they were generally
better able to put these deficiencies into perspective by pointing to the difficult context
of the treaty bodies, such as the limited resources and time as well as the politicized
elections for new expert members (Krommendijk 2014b: 357–359).
The following statements illustrate the low reputation and limited legitimacy of the
treaty bodies in the eyes of government officials. One Dutch official from the Ministry
of Social Affairs for example argued that the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights is Ban amateurish Committee that made arbitrary decisions. As com-
pared to, for instance, the ILO institutions, it functioned as a kangaroo court^ (Reiding
2007: 146). Officials pointed to the basic and limited knowledge of several treaty body
members about the national context and the poor preparation of some members. A New
Zealand official held that treaty bodies do not have the background or expertise to deal
with Bhuge policy issues^ with Bhuge significance for states^ (MacKay 1999: 16).
Likewise, an internal briefing of the New Zealand Ministry of Women’s Affairs about
the COs of the CEDAW Committee argued that: Bit is disappointing that some of the
recommendations do not fully reflect New Zealand’s domestic situation^ (MWA 2008:
appendix B). Officials also lamented the one-sided approach of treaty bodies and the
Table 3 Quantitative overview of the number of legislative, policy or any other measures that have been
taken in the Netherlands, New Zealand and Finland as a result of the COs
CRC CEDAW ICERD CAT ICCPR ICESCR TOTAL
NL 11 7 4 1 1 0 24
NZ 11 3 2 4 0 0 20
FIN 11 4 4 4 3 0 30
TOTAL 33 14 10 9 4 0 74
For Finland, there have been four effective COs which were recommended by two or more treaty bodies.
These are not put in the table, which explains why the number of effective COs for Finland adds up to 26
instead of 30
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fact that they easily take over information and criticism of NGOs without any factual
check. The same briefing of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs about the CEDAW
Committee stated that Bsome criticism … is unbalanced. In particular, some of the
criticism gives undue weight to the input of non-governmental organization without
any supporting evidence^ (MWA 2008: appendix B). Moreover, government officials
had the feeling that some of the COs were already completed before the actual
dialogue, which in their view also hampered the legitimacy of treaty bodies. In
addition, officials criticized the lack of independence and the political nature of the
process as well. New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark stated about the Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: BThis is a Committee on the outer edges
of the UN system. It is not a court. It did not follow any rigorous process as we would
understand one. In fact, the process itself would not withstand scrutiny at all […] Well,
I think I have a somewhat better understanding of the UN system than they do^
(Charters and Erueti 2005: 258).
These statements show that those who need to be persuaded; the government
officials and members of government do not see the potential persuaders (the treaty
bodies) as legitimate. Treaty bodies, thus, have a rather bad reputation. This reduces the
reputational costs for states when they do not act upon the COs. There are also other
reasons for the limited reputational costs for states and especially established democ-
racies. Firstly, the COs and the treaty bodies are hardly known outside a small circle of
diplomats and government officials (Steiner 2000: 38–39; Downs and Jones 2002: 112;
Simmons 2009: 124–125). Secondly, it is often not clear when states deviate from COs,
because COs are generally rather ambiguous and treaty bodies hardly determine in
explicit terms in their COs that a country has violated a treaty provision (Guzman 2008:
1863). Thirdly, as was discussed before, established democracies with a rather solid
human rights reputation, such as Netherlands, New Zealand and Finland, can relatively
easily resist implementing unfavorable COs (see section 2.2.1). This is because a strong
human rights-abiding status makes it possible to offset reputational costs of COs.
The question, however, remains as to whether or not the officials speak ill of the
treaty bodies because the treaty bodies do not have legitimacy in their eyes or if they are
trying to make the COs appear illegitimate because they simply do not like the
recommendation.8 In both cases the outcome would be non-implementation, but the
underlying causal mechanisms are quite different. The answer is a bit of both. It is a
natural reaction for governments to initially disagree with recommendations when they
require a change of the status quo (Cohen 1996). This defensive attitude also stems
from a certain degree of self-righteousness, especially among Dutch and New Zealand
government officials. UN human rights treaties and the treaty bodies are primarily seen
as relevant for others. An internal debriefing to the New Zealand Minister for Social
Development about the dialogue with the CRC Committee in 2011, for example,
mentioned that: BThe Chair of the Committee later told me that our examination was
though as they look to New Zealand as a world leader and they wanted to really test us
and learn from our experience^ (MSD 2011: para. 12). In order to justify their
dismissive attitude, governments and government officials portrayed the treaty bodies—
and their COs — as illegitimate by focusing on their deficiencies, such as their
limited expertise or independence. They did this in order to downplay the necessity
8 I would like to thank the peer reviewer for highlighting this point.
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of implementing (specific) COs. The bad reputation of the treaty bodies in the eyes of
officials thus enabled officials to discredit the COs.
One question is whether the variance in the effectiveness of COs of the various
treaty bodies can be explained by different reputations of certain treaty bodies. This is
not the case. Two findings in particular support this conclusion. Firstly, the lower
legitimacy and reputation of the CRC Committee and its COs in the eyes of officials in
all three countries has not led to a lower effectiveness of the COs in comparison with
the COs of the other treaty bodies, as hypothesis 1 would predict. On the contrary. In
section 5 it was argued that most of the follow-up measures as a result of the COs
related to the COs of the CRC Committee. Government officials were, however, not
more positive about the CRC Committee and its COs, compared with the other treaty
bodies. They were sometimes even more critical about the CRC Committee
(Krommendijk 2014a: 377–378). This is well illustrated by the views of Dutch
government officials about the CRC Committee. One Dutch government official
counted the CRC Committee among the Bactivist^ committees that do not always keep
a close eye on the text of the CRC. Some officials even held that the CRC Committee
was undeservedly critical and tendentious and approached the state delegation without
respect in some instances. They specifically singled out the attack of the Indonesian
chair during the dialogue in 1999, allegedly based on personal feelings owing to the
colonial past. One official spoke about Bsneering and conceited remarks^ about the
Brotten policy^ in the Netherlands. In addition, it was noted that the great majority of
expert members of the CRC Committee had not read the report and did not seem
interested in the discussion but primarily in other issues, such as their return flight or the
submission of their expense account. Legitimacy-based explanations can thus not
account for the higher effectiveness of the COs of the CRC Committee.
Secondly, further support against the hypothesis that a higher legitimacy translates
into a higher effectiveness are the COs of the HRC monitoring the ICCPR. These COs
have remained almost completely ineffective even though government officials in all
three countries were less negative about the HRC. The HRC has a reputation of being
the most professional and most serious committee. Officials generally mentioned the
sessions and dialogues as among the best given the detailed and focused questions and
structured dialogue. These relatively positive views have, nonetheless, not resulted in a
higher effectiveness of the COs of the HRC. Table 3 showed that the COs of the HRC
have been least effective of all the six treaty bodies, with the exception of the CESCR.
Only four COs of the HRC have had some effect (Krommendijk 2014a: 378).
The only exception to the finding that legitimacy-based explanations cannot or
hardly account for the effectiveness COs is the position of the Committee Against
Torture in New Zealand and— to a lesser extent— Finland. Officials in both countries
did not really question the legitimacy of the Committee Against Torture and they
considered the dialogue with and the COs of this Committee relatively useful. Several
government officials in New Zealand argued, for example, that the dialogue and the
resulting COs in 2009 were better informed and more sensible. The latter was also
attributed to the inclusion in the government delegation to the dialogue with the
Committee Against Torture of officials from the Department of Corrections who have
an operational background. This led to a more technical and better informed discussion
with this Committee. The COs of 2009 consequently trickled through to the Depart-
ment of Corrections and a couple of things were done at the operational level. Another
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reason for the latter was the open attitude of some officials. One official from the New
Zealand Corrections Departments, for example, expressed a genuine willingness to
learn from overseas and also change things to improve them. He noted that he was
inspired by the dialogue with the Committee Against Torture in 2009 and persuaded to
act upon the COs. After the dialogue he also exchanged several issues with a Com-
mittee member via email. The latter official initiated training workshops on the
framework of international human rights obligations for prison personnel together with
the New Zealand Human Rights Commission. Another example of persuasion on the
basis of the Committee Against Torture are the measures taken to strengthen the
independence of the Independent Police Conduct Authority. This was done as a result
of the COs 2009 of the Committee in which it had expressed its concern about the
impartiality of the Authority with respect to investigation into alleged acts of torture
and ill-treatment by members of the police, because of the inclusion of current and
former police officers (CAT 2009: para. 12). It recommended the Authority to be
staffed with independent experts only. There was initial reluctance among government
officials to address this CO because legislative changes had recently been made to
assure the Authority’s independence already. The COs were, nonetheless, acted upon
and led to a big overhaul of staff. One factor that contributed to the willingness to take
measures was that the Chair of the Police Conduct Authority, Justice Goddard, was
deeply concerned about the CO and its effect on how the Authority would be perceived.
This might be because of her interest in and knowledge about the international human
rights framework and its importance, which is illustrated -or influenced by- her election
to the Subcommittee on the prevention of torture in October 2010.
According to hypothesis 1, the higher the legitimacy and reputation of the treaty
body in the eyes of government officials, the greater the effectiveness of COs of that
respective treaty body. There are few empirical results from the three established
democracies included in this research that could support this hypothesis, with the
possible exception of the Committee Against Torture and some of its COs in New
Zealand.
6.2 Hypothesis 2: Domestic and transnational mobilization
The effectiveness of COs can primarily be explained by the mobilization and lobby of
domestic actors. The following three examples, one from every country, show that
domestic mobilization is crucial for the effectiveness of COs. They also illustrate how
domestic actors, such as NGOs and MPs, use the COs to strengthen and legitimize their
claims. The first example includes the steps taken in the Netherlands to avoid the joint
detention of juvenile offenders and children institutionalized for behavioral problems.
The CRC Committee recommended this in 2004 (CRC 2004: para. 59(d)). Shortly after
the dialogue in 2004 between the government delegation and the CRC Committee, the
government decided to house these two categories of minors separately. The govern-
ment argued that this decision was made Bpartly in response^ to the CO (UN Doc.
2008: para. 271). It took, however, until 1 January 2010 before the process of separate
housing was eventually completed. In this period, various domestic actors kept pressure
on the government to expedite this process. The CRC and the CO were used as a
supporting argument by several domestic actors, including MPs and children’s rights
NGOs (TK 2009/10: 12). Government officials and NGO representatives that were
504 J. Krommendijk
interviewed confirmed that the CRC in general and the CO in particular were two of the
many factors that played a role in accelerating the separate housing of these two
categories of minors.
The most prominent example of an effective CO in New Zealand was the prohibition
of corporal punishment as the CRC Committee recommended in 1997 and 2003 (CRC
2003: para. 29–30). As a matter of fact, it was not a prohibition, but a repeal of section
59 of the Crimes Act 1961 which provided a defence for parents charged with
assaulting their children to use reasonable force for the purpose of correction. The
legislative change was initiated by the MP Bradford (Green Party). She announced her
private members Bill on 6 October 2003, 3 days after the CRC Committee adopted the
COs. Bradford explicitly stated that she was Bstirred into political action by the
recommendations that the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child made on two
occasions^ (Wood et al. 2008: 204). The COs of the CRC Committee were
not sufficient in themselves to realize the legislative change. A comprehensive and
detailed study of 2008 about the issue concluded that the eventual repeal was due to
Brich combination of influences that helped to bring about the eventual change^ (Wood
et al. 2008: 33). Crucial was the advocacy of the Children’s Commissioner
and NGOs like End Physical Punishment of Children (EPOCH), UNICEF and Save the
Children. There were regular exchanges between Bradford and child advocates and
children’s NGOs, some of which also acted as advisors to her. This lobby already
started before the COs 1997 and continued until 2007 when the Act was adopted after a
lengthy and complex political and legislative process. The reason that it took more than
4 years before the Act was adopted was because of the heavy opposition from Christian
lobby groups and large parts of the population who feared that repeal would seriously
undermine the authority and autonomy of parents and give children an excuse to
misbehave (Wood et al. 2008: 55 and 57). In such a polarized environment,
the COs eventually helped -amongst many other factors- to tilt the balance in favor of
the children’s rights minded proponents of repeal. The COs were an (international)
endorsement and support for them. It gave them an additional level of legitimacy and as
a justification for change. The CRC and the COs were also considered useful instru-
ments for advocates to hang their arguments on and gave them a strong position to
discuss and advocate the matter with Ministers.
The third example of an effective CO is the recommendation of the CRC Committee
to Finland to establish a separate Children’s Ombudsman (CRC 1996: para. 1027). In
2000, the government expressed the view that it was Bunlikely, in the current political
atmosphere, that a separate Children’s Ombudsman would be created,^ especially
because there was no budget for it (UN Doc. 2000: para. 43). Nonetheless, a new
government Barrived at a significant milestone in 2003^ by including the establishment
of a separate Ombudsman as one of the objectives in its Government Programme of 24
June 2003 (UN Doc 2003: para. 37). The Children’s Ombudsman took office on 1
September 2005. What was the role of the COs in this change in the position of the
government? It is important to note that there had already been a discussion in Finland
about the matter since the 1980s. It had especially been on the political agenda since
1995, prior to the COs 1996 (Niemi 2003: 36). This means that the COs primarily
coincided with the will and needs at the national level. The COs played a strong role
among many other factors by increasing the pressure and by helping proponents in
national discussions with an extra argument. In that way, the COs gave a final or extra
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push and, hence, sped up the process. One important factor was the role of NGOs who
repeated and, hence, kept the issue on the agenda.
The three examples show that effective COs have not been a sufficient cause on their
own to instigate a change in policy or legislation. Rather, COs have almost always been
a contributory cause among many other factors that jointly had an effect (Cohn 1991:
297; Kälin 2012: 64). This means that COs hardly do any Bheavy lifting.^ This does,
however, not mean that they are merely epiphenomenal. COs have had an intensifying
or catalyst effect, whereby they supported, strengthened or legitimized the arguments of
domestic actors. COs have in this way supported or given extra strength to a certain
direction and have pushed or accelerated a certain political process. The examples also
show that an important precondition for the Blanding^ of the COs is the existence of a
political momentum in the form of an on-going national debate. In addition, the
concerns in the COs should resonate with the activities, interests and claims of some
domestic actors. Domestic actors play an essential role in the political or legal process
which leads to the COs’ effectiveness.
One question is whether mobilization is always a necessary condition. Has there
been instances in which governments have acted upon the COs in the absence of
(significant) domestic mobilization? This only happened in a few cases when imple-
mentation of COs had only limited financial implications. The effectiveness of such
COs was frequently the result of endeavors of individual government officials based on
their personal preferences. Officials sometimes used the COs as an additional argument
or justification to convince their minister or parliament of the necessity of change. The
endeavors of officials only bore results in the absence of public attention when there
was no or hardly any domestic opposition. Individual government officials were hardly
in a position to Bdecide^ a national debate when the government, parliament or public
opinion was against change. One example is the abolishment of the possibility of
imposing a life imprisonment on minors in the Netherlands in 2005 (CRC 2004: para.
59). One government official interviewed, who was closely involved in the drafting of
the bill, stated that the legislative amendment was a clear result of the COs. The official
argued that it was the official’s personal initiative to take up this issue. The official
perceived political room for this proposal and anticipated that both the responsible
minister and parliament would agree with it. The interviewed official argued that
agreement would have been easy to secure because life imprisonment of minors was
a relative non-issue in the Netherlands and had never been applied in practice. The
interviewed official saw implementation of these COs primarily as a symbolic act
without actual (political) costs and consequences. Another example is the criminaliza-
tion of torture in Finland. On 1 January 2010, new penal provisions entered into force
with that included a separate punishable offence for torture. This issue was considered a
relative non-issue and of Bsymbolic value^ rather than something which would amount
to a real change requiring considerable (additional) resources (UN Doc. 2005: para. 4).
A related matter is whether domestic mobilization has always been sufficient. This is
certainly not the case, nor does mobilization always result in (the desired) policy
change in line with the COs. Lobby and advocacy has obviously not always been
successful and has not led to legislative, policy or any other measures each time.
Examples include several COs in relation to the asylum legislation and procedure in the
three countries, even though these COs have been used quite frequently in the lobby of
NGOs and by predominantly left-wing and green MPs.
506 J. Krommendijk
The pertinent question that remains to be answered is whether the difference in the
effectiveness of COs of the six treaty bodies could be explained on the basis of different
levels of domestic and transnational mobilization. It was argued in section 6.1 that
reputational and legitimacy-based explanations cannot account for this variance in the
effectiveness of COs. Rather, it is the mechanism of domestic and transnational
mobilization that is determinative. There has been more mobilization and lobby of
domestic actors in relation to the CRC Committee than the other treaty bodies. In the
Netherlands there were, for example, 56 parliamentary minutes in which MPs referred
to the COs of the CRC Committee, while the COs of the other five treaty bodies
together were mentioned in only 44 min (Krommendijk 2014a: 218 and 256). Media
coverage of the reporting process under the CRC has also been significantly higher in
the Netherlands than any of the other five treaty bodies. 37 of the 97 articles referring to
the reporting process under the six treaties dealt with the CRC (Krommendijk 2014a:
256). In addition, the strongest and most active NGOs with respect to reporting in the
Netherlands were children’s rights NGOs. A similar picture can be sketched for New
Zealand and Finland. In all three countries, there have been large coalitions of
children’s rights NGOs having an interest in and focusing on the reporting process
under the CRC. These NGOs have been more professional and better funded than many
of the other domestic human rights NGOs. They have deliberately used reporting and
COs to inform their advocacy and to support their arguments. What’s more, in New
Zealand and Finland there has also been a Children’s Ombudsman who has been
closely involved in the reporting process and the monitoring of the implementation
of COs. Both Ombudsmen have used the COs as an important part of their advocacy
and lobby work. A similar picture can be sketched for the mobilization in relation to the
CEDAW Committee, which is slightly less than that in relation to the CRC Committee
(Krommendijk 2014a: 255–257 and 369–372). By contrast, mobilization on the basis
of the COs of the other four treaty bodies, and especially the HRC and CESCR, has
been considerably lower in the three countries (Krommendijk 2014a: 369–372).
The finding that domestic mobilization in the three established democracies primar-
ily exists in relation to the COs of the CRC Committee, and to a lesser extent the COs
of the CEDAW Committee, suggests that the rights of innocent or vulnerable people
may be more of an issue in established liberal democracies than elsewhere in the world.
This is also visible in Table 3 indicating that the effectiveness of COs related was highly
concentrated around two human rights issues: rights of the child (CRC) and, to a lesser
extent, discrimination against women (CEDAW). It could be argued that in other types
of countries other human rights treaties or issues receive more attention. Further
research is necessary to establish whether this is indeed the case. The limited evidence
available so far indicates that the CRC has had more effects than other treaties in some
countries (Simmons 2009, 357–358). This illustrates that children’s rights are generally
easier to get around and have a built-in pressure group (children), on behalf of whom
many professional NGOs operate. Children’s rights are also seen as less controversial,
at least in principle and on an abstract level.
The observed variance in domestic and transnational mobilization also implies that
there is not a strong relation between the legitimacy and reputation of the treaty bodies
and the level of mobilization, contrary to the expectation formulated at the end of
section 2.2.2. As said before, there has almost been no mobilization on the basis of the
HRC even though this treaty body enjoys the most solid reputation of the six treaty
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bodies. By contrast, the greatest level of mobilization existed on the basis of the COs of
the CRC Committee, which enjoyed considerably less legitimacy in the eyes of
government officials than the HRC. Some anecdotal evidence was, however, found
in support of this relationship when comparing the mobilization in relation to the six
UN human rights treaties with several Council of Europe mechanisms. The ECtHR, the
European Committee on the Prevention of Torture (ECPT) and the European Com-
mission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) were seen by Dutch government
officials and other domestic actors as more legitimate than the UN treaty bodies. Partly
because of this, there has been greater domestic mobilization in the Netherlands in
relation to these regional human rights monitoring bodies (Krommendijk 2014a, 113–
114, 137 and 209–210). Future research should examine this relationship between the
legitimacy and reputation of international (human rights) monitoring bodies and mo-
bilization in more detail.
Hypothesis 2 expected that the greater the level of domestic or transnational
mobilization, the higher the effectiveness of COs. This article found empirical support
for this hypothesis. The dominant mechanism explaining the effectiveness of most of
the COs in the three established democracies is indeed the lobby and advocacy of
domestic and transnational actors.
7 Conclusion
This article showed that there is a general propensity in the Netherlands, New Zealand
and Finland not to take measures as a result of the COs. This does, however, not mean
that the COs have remained completely ineffective. There have seen several COs in the
three countries that were important factors contributing to policy or legislative change.
The effectiveness of most of the COs can primarily be explained by domestic actors
who have both pressed and persuaded the government to act upon the COs. This
corresponds to the recent conclusion of Hafner-Burton that international laws and
procedures must Bcreep into domestic affairs [and] be taken up by local advocates^
in order to be effective (Hafner-Burton 2013: 11). When this happens, the COs can play
a valuable role and contribute to policy or legislative change or any other measures.
COs can give strength to the arguments and demands of domestic actors in persuading
governments to change their policy or legislation. COs can thus act, in the words of
Simmons and Dai, as a valuable tool or focal point which supports domestic mobili-
zation (Simmons 2009: 135; Dai 2013: 96).
This article showed that here were hardly any effective COs in the three established
democracies which could (solely) be explained on the basis of reputational and
legitimacy-based arguments. This fits well into the (empirical) literature on this matter
which found that policy change through persuasion alone has hardly occurred in
practice (March and Olsen 1998: 952–953; Kelley 2004: 430; Neumayer 2005: 930;
Risse and Ropp 2013: 14). The treaty bodies generally have a bad reputation in the eyes
of government officials. The treaty bodies’ negative reputation and limited legitimacy
has enabled government officials to ignore or explicitly reject COs. Some of the COs of
the Committee Against Torture have, however, escaped this unfortunate fate. This
difference can be explained by the clearly delimited and restricted nature of the treaty
and issue area, which is also rather Btechnical.^ In addition, partly because of these
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different features, some government officials have also been more willing to learn from
the Committee Against Torture.
Be that as it may, COs have not solely remained Bpaper pushing^ docu-
ments, because there have been several COs which have been a contributory -
and sometimes even a decisive- factor contributing to legislative and policy
change. At the same time, COs have not been Bpolicy prompting,^ because
there have hardly been any measures that would not have come about without
COs and which were only taken because of the COs. Rather, COs constitute
Bpractical props^ which can give extra strength or legitimacy to the arguments
and demands of domestic actors when they are advocating for policy or
legislative change.
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